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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It seems reasonably clear that, if I direct my broker to purchase 100
shares of xyz stock in the name of my son and I pay the purchase
price, I have transferred 100 shares of xyz stock, not the dollars paid. 2
If a decedent seeks out the insurer, negotiates all the terms of the policy,
requests the insurer to create all the policy rights in another, and pays the
first premium which actually brings the contractual rights, as evidenced
by the policy issued, into existence, to say that this is not a "transfer" by
the decedent is to put form over substance. If the decedent continues to
pay the premiums, he remains the motivating force of the transaction, at
least with respect to the amount of proceeds attributable to the premium
payments within three years of his death. The premium was paid to the
insurer to purchase an asset-the asset being the insurer's promise to pay
the policy proceeds on the death of the insured. Inherent in life insurance
is the fact that the value of the company's promise to pay is always in-
creasing in value as death draws nearer. The decedent's payment to the
insurer is prompted by the knowledge that this manner of payment will
assure him of getting something more for his money, i.e., a benefit to the
donee greater than the dollars paid for the premium payment, in the form
of insurance proceeds in excess of the money paid.
On balance, the pro rata valuation (the Revenue Ruling's procedure
for valuation) seems to be the method which best carries out the
prior policies and decisions regarding the taxation of gifts in contempla-
tion of death. It takes cognizance of the donor's intent in paying the
premiums and does not violate the congressional intent that underlays
the amendments to section 2042.3
MICHAEL DONWELL GUNTER
Insurance-Life Insurance Applications: Opinion Answers or
Material Misrepresentations
With its recent decision in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v.
Barden,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit may have demon-
strated that the converse of the time-worn judicial apology, "hard cases
make bad law," is not necessarily true. Beneath Barden's deceptively
6 Stephens, The Clifford Shadow over the Federal Estate Tax, 4 GA. L. REv.
233, 243 (1970).
" See Note, 82 HAnv. L. Rxv., supra note 40, at 1771.
1424 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1970).
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simple exterior, one finds a questionable application of an established in-
surance law doctrine that is worthy of close scrutiny.
On September 29, 1966, Frank Barden, forty-eight years old and an
accountant by profession, applied for two policies on his life, each in the
amount of ten thousand dollars. His written application under a group
-plan for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants avowed
the completeness and truth of its contents, among which were the following
questions and Barden's corresponding answers:
10. Has the Person Proposed for Insurance ever been treated for or
had any indication of: Yes No
(d) Stomach or Intestinal Trouble? (x) ( )
11. Has the Person Proposed for Insurance within the past 5 years:
(a) Had or been advised to have a surgical Yes No
operation? (X) ()
(b) Been a patient in or advised to enter a hospital
or sanitorium? (X) ( )
(c) Consulted, been attended or examined by a
doctor or other practitioner? (X) ( )
12. Has the Person Proposed for Insurance any physical deformities,
impairments or ill health not recorded in answer to Question 10 or 11 ?
Yes No
( ) (X)
13. What are the complete details of all "Yes" answers to Questions
10, 11 and 12?
Condition, Details and Complete
Question Number of Attacks Duration of Recovery
No. (if operated, so state) Disability Month Year
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With the exception of the disclosed appendectomy, Barden omitted all
mention of his lengthy medical history which included diagnoses of a
ruptured blood vessel in the stomach or esophagus, cirrhosis of the liver,
and acute alcoholism.3 The policies were issued on October 1 and remained
in force until the insured's death from acute pancreatitis three months
later.
In the insurer's subsequent suit to rescind the policies because of
alleged material misrepresentations, the trial court granted its motion for
summary judgment and concluded that "in fact and in law the answers to
questions 12 and 13 ... were clearly false, with no waiver or estoppel on
the part of . . . [the company]; that said answers were material as a
matter of law. . . ."' On appeal, with the evidential facts not in dispute,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the
insurance company had failed to prove a misrepresentation and in any
event, the company by issuing the life insurance policy waived any claim
it had of material misrepresentation.5
Section 58-30 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides:
All statements or descriptions in any application for a policy of in-
surance, or in the policy itself, shall be deemed representations and not
warranties, and a representation, unless material or fraudulent, will
not prevent a recovery on the policy. 6
The purpose of this statute is to prevent the insurer from avoiding pay-
ment of honest losses upon technicalities and strict construction of the
insurance contract.7 Its use of the disjunctive, "or," is singularly im-
' Within one year after the disclosed appendicitis operation, Barden was read-
mitted to the same hospital on complaint of nausea and vomiting of blood. Follow-
ing two injections of whole blood and glucose, he remained there for over a
week pending a final diagnosis of a ruptured blood vessel in the stomach or esoph-
agus. Gall bladder difficulty had been suspected, but tests for the disorder proved
negative. On January 17, 1966, he consulted a different physician (Dr. Weeks) from
the one who had attended him in the past (Dr. Bell) in order to receive a general
check-up because of excessive fatigue. Dr. Weeks' examination resulted in a di-
agnosis of acute alcoholism with directions to remain on a special diet and abstain
completely from alcoholic indulgence. Three months later (and only five months
prior to his application for insurance), Barden was admitted to Rocky Mount Sani-
tarium Hospital due to abdominal pain, nausea and frequent regurgitation of food.
After a six day convalescence, he was released-this time with a diagnosis of cirrho-
sis of the liver. From this date until the time of his death he continued periodically
to consult Dr. Weeks, who, though noting some improvement in Barden's condition,
kept his original directions in force. Id. at 1008-12.
1Id. at 1007.5 Id. at 1006.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30 (1965).
'Garvey v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 153 F. Supp. 755, 757 (E.D.N.C. 1957); Cot-
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portant to the insurer, for it obviates the necessity of proving knowledge
or intent in a suit to rescind the policy because of a misrepresentation of a
material fact.' In North Carolina the issue of materiality is resolved by
the application of what has been termed the "individual insurer" rule :9 If
the knowledge or ignorance of the disputed fact would naturally influence
the judgment of the insurer in accepting the risk or in fixing the rate of
the premium, then that fact is deemed to be material."0 Ordinarily, the
resolution of this question is for the jury,1 but like many general rules,
this, too, is subject to exception. In an application for a policy of life
insurance, it is established law in North Carolina that written questions
relating to health, and written answers thereto, are considered material
as a matter of law.' In such cases, the only relevant inquiries for the jury
are whether the insured made the statement and if so, whether it was
false.' 3
In ruling upon the effect of the insured's answer to question 12, the
court neatly avoided the issue of materiality by treating the inquiry as if
it called only for an opinion. Basing its decision upon the physician's
optimistic reports of the preceding May and August,'4 the court concluded
that these reports
tingham v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 168 N.C. 259, 261, 84 S.E. 274, 275
(1915).8 See Walker v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 127 F. Supp. 26, 29 (E.D.N.C.
1954); Tolbert v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 236 N.C. 416, 418, 72 S.E.2d 915,
917 (1952); Inman v. The Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, 211
N.C. 179, 181, 189 S.E. 496, 497 (1937).
'Note, Insurance: Concealment and Misrepresentation as Grounds to Avoid
Policy, 5 U.C.L.A.L. R!v. 332, 334 & n.15 (1958).
o E.g., Garvey v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 153 F. Supp. 755, 757 (E.D.N.C. 1957);
Tolbert v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 236 N.C. 416, 418-19, 72 S.E.2d 915, 917
(1952) ; Wells v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 211 N.C. 427, 429, 190 S.E. 744,
745 (1937); Gardner v. North State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 367, 374, 79
S.E. 806, 809 (1913).
"
1E.g., Senandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 256 F. Supp. 366, 367 (E.D.N.C.
1966); Carroll v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 227 N.C. 456, 458, 42 S.E.2d 607, 608
(1947); Howell v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 189 N.C. 212, 217, 126 S.E. 603, 605-06
(1925).
1 E.g., Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 256 F. Supp. 366, 367 (E.D.N.C.
1966); Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 40, 125 S.E.2d 326,
332 (1962); Rhinehardt v. North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 671, 673,
119 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1961).
' Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 40, 125 S.E.2d 326, 332
(1962); Rhinehardt v. North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 671, 673, 119
S.E.2d 614, 616 (1961).
, 424 F.2d at 1007.
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were certainly sufficient to justify a lay patient to believe that a few
weeks later, without an intervening sickness, he could say in good
faith that he was not then suffering from "any physical deformities,
impairments or ill health not recorded" in the catechism of 10 and 11.16
Although such an approach might be justified in light of Jeffress v. New
York Life Insurance Co., 6 it would appear that the court overstepped its
function in passing upon the insured's good faith. When weighed against
the evidence of the insured's medical history and his knowledge of the
past diagnoses, 1" his good faith in responding to question 12 would not
appear to be so overwhelming as to justify the appellate court's summary
decision in the insured's favor.
In addition, the court's analysis of question number 12 would seem to
permit recovery based upon the insured's bona fide belief of his apparent
state of health. Besides being out of harmony with a number of other
courts,'8 such an effect would seem to contradict Hines v. New England
Casualty Co.,"9 upon which Jeffress relies.20 In Hines the applicant for
insurance had stated that he was in " 'sound condition, mentally and
physically,' "21 despite his knowledge of an existing hernia. In the in-
surer's subsequent suit to rescind the policy, the court held for the de-
fendant, but added:
Few people are absolutely exempt from some variation from a perfect
condition, and, unless such variation is specifically asked about in the
application and denied, it is not a matter vitiating the policy, unless the
15Id. at 1008.
1674 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1935). "[W]here an inquiry as to physical condition or
previous illness calls for what is in effect an opinion by the applicant, an answer
made in good faith will not avoid the policy." Id. at 876.
1 7424 F.2d at 1007.
"
8E.g., Perkins v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 383, 128 A.2d
207 (1956); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 198 Okla. 561, 180
P.2d 647 (1947); Grover v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 Vt. 246, 125
A.2d 571 (1956).
The rationale of the actual good health doctrine is that the parties, being free
to contract as they pleased, have in unmistakable terms made the fact of good
health a condition precedent to insurance coverage and that it is not within
the province of the court, whatever its sympathies, to remake the insurance
contract, either by deleting the good health clause or by reading into it
language which is not there.
Wick, The Good Health Clause-What it Says and What So.re Courts Say it Says,
23 INs. CoUNsEL J. 311, 313 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Wick].
19 172 N.C. 225, 90 S.E. 131 (1916).
2 74 F.2d at 876.
21 172 N.C. at 226, 90 S.E. at 132.
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variation was serious enough to affect his "soundness" so that any
one would say who knew the facts, "He is not a sound man. '22
Thus, what began in Hines as a third party's opinion of actual health
founded upon scienter has, in Jeffress, evolved to the point of permitting
the applicant's statement of apparent state of health founded upon good
faith belief.2" Although the approach taken in Jeffress (and thereby,
Barden) seems more in keeping with the policy behind section 58-30 of
the North Carolina General Statutes,2 4 the decision in Hines serves as a
reminder of the jury's role as the trier of fact. In Hines, the jury was
confined to determining whether the insured was or was not a sound man.
With the subsequent liberalization of the rule in Jeffress, the jury should
at least have been given the opportunity in Barden to decide whether the
insured had a bona fide belief that he was in good health, and if so, whether
such belief was reasonable.25
In passing upon the insurer's assertion of incompleteness in question
13, the court branded the inquiry as an "omnibus inquisition for details."26
Such a label is misleading in light of the fact that treatment for slight
or temporary indispositions may be regarded as immaterial where the
applicant fully discloses medical treatment for a serious ailment admin-
istered at or about the same time.2 7 Standing alone, therefore, question 13
requires that the applicant for insurance disclose only those facts and cir-
cumstances which, from a pragmatic standpoint, would be likely to affect
the insurer's judgment in accepting the risk or in fixing the rate of the
premium. Yet, in deciding that question thirteen was suitably answered
in the context of question 10, the court only concerned itself with the
insured's liver ailment. Nowhere did the court mention the diagnosis of
22 Id. (emphasis added).
"' But cf. Huffman v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 8 N.C. App. 186, 174 S.E.2d
17 (1970). Decided one month after Barden, this case seems to imply a continued
adherence to the actual good health doctrine. In support of this doctrine, it has
been argued that the average layman both knows and understands the distinction
between the term "good health" as used in daily conversation and "good health"
as used in formal insurance contracts. The latter is understood to be a condition
precedent to the enforceability of the contract and thereby could only mean actual
good health. Wick at 317.2
'N.C. GE. STAT. § 58-30 (1965). See p. 562 supra.
25 Cf. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. William J. Champion & Co., 350 F.2d 115, 126
(6th Cir. 1965) ; Union Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, - Ark. -- -, 449 S.W.2d 192, 195
(1970).
2 424 F.2d at 1008.
"'E.g., Jeffress v. New York Life Ins. Co., 74 F.2d 874, 877 (4th Cir. 1935);
Anthony v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 11, 173 S.E. 6, 8 (1934).
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a ruptured blood vessel in the stomach or esophagus or the insured's his-
tory of vomiting blood.2" Certainly the former condition constitutes
"stomach or intestinal trouble," and the facts of Thomas-Yelverton Co.
v. State Capitol Life Insurance Co.2" so closely parallel the latter symptom
as to raise grave questions as to the court's propriety in omitting it from
their analysis.
Similarly, the court explains away any culpability of the insured in
failing to enumerate the circumstances surrounding the affirmative answers
to question 11 by ruling that the insurer already had the equivalent of the
information it sought." Quoting from Gouldin v. Inter-Ocean Insurance
Co.,"' the court pointed out:
Knowledge of facts which the insurer has or should have had con-
stitutes notice of whatever an inquiry would have disclosed and is
binding on the insurer. The rule applies to insurance companies that
whatever puts a person on inquiry amounts in law to "notice" of such
facts as an inquiry pursued with ordinary diligence and understanding
would have disclosed.3 2
Although this argument is entitled to some weight in light of the in-
sured's limited response to question 13, which in turn left his affirmative
replies to question 11 unanswered, the court destroys much of its force by
an earlier observation. In ruling that the insured had answered question
11 as fully as its broad phraseology would permit, the court admitted:
Each of these rejoinders could well have been referable to the ap-
pendectomy. Likewise they could have related to the medical attention
he received for liver troubles or to any of the possible maladies not
appearing in question 10. No deception or half-truth is proved here.83
Although no deception or half-truth was proved in question 11, this same
statement highlights the fallacy of the argument that the insurer was in
possession of facts sufficient to put it on notice in question 13. It is
true that insurance contracts are to be construed liberally in favor of the
28 424 F.2d at 1007.
29238 N.C. 278, 77 S.E.2d 692 (1953). Here, the insured's negative response to
a question pertaining to the existence of any diseases of the stomach was held to
afford sufficient grounds for rescission on the insurer's showing that the insured had
experienced the vomiting of blood in connection with a peptic ulcer.
80 424 F.2d at 1009.8t248 N.C. 161, 102 S.E.2d 846 (1958).
82424 F.2d at 1010.
3 Id. at 1009.
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insured.8" But though the sword may cut sharper on the side of the in-
sured, this does not necessarily imply that it cannot be double-edged at all.
Just as the responses to question 11 might have alluded to either the
insured's appendectomy or liver ailment, so too might the limited response
to question 13 have indicated that the affirmative answers in question 11
were similarly limited to question 10(d). Inasmuch as the opinion of the
individual insurer is favored over that of similar or reasonably prudent
insurers upon the issue of materiality,'- it would seem reasonable to afford
the specific insurer an opportunity to show its interpretation of a disputed
answer when the representation is deemed material as a matter of law.
Even assuming that the insurer did have a duty of inquiry, it could
only be held to those facts which an investigation pursued with ordinary
diligence would have disclosed.36 Had it undertaken such an inquiry,
it is highly doubtful that it would have obtained the vital information with
which it was ultimately charged. The only details disclosed in question
13 concerned the insurer's hospitalization at Memorial Hospital under
the care of Dr. Bell. Although an investigation of the hospital records
would have revealed the insured's subsequent admittance for the vomiting
of blood, it would have shown that he left the hospital apparently well and
with no indications of his extensive liver ailment.37 Nor is there any sug-
gestion either that Dr. Bell was aware of the insured's later treatment by
Dr. Weeks or that Memorial Hospital had any record of the insured's con-
finement at the other sanitarium.38
In its concluding remarks the court holds that even if the insured had
concealed material facts, the insurer waived the defect and elected to treat
them as immaterial.3 9 It is clear that an insurer may waive provisions that
are inserted in an insurance contract for its benefit. 4' By acting on an
answer that is unresponsive or manifestly incomplete, an insurer precludes
later objection on its part.41 "But ... the mere fact that the insurer has
" E.g., National Bank v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 125 F.2d 920, 923 (4th Cir. 1942) ;
Suits v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co., 249 N.C. 383, 386, 106 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1959) ;
Mills v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 210 N.C. 439, 441, 187 S.E. 581, 582 (1936).
Note, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv., supra note 9, at 334 & n.15.
Note, Itsurance-Isurer's Duty-Investigation for Suspected Fraud Prior to
Issuance of Life Policy, 10 Anx. L. REv. 499, 499-500 (1956).
37 424 F.2d at 1007.
" Id. at 1012 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 1010.
"' E.g., Bray v. North Carolina Police Voluntary Benefit Ass'n, 258 N.C. 419,
424, 128 S.E.2d 766, 770 (1963) ; Widows Fund of Sudan Temple v. Umphlett, 246
N.C. 555, 560, 99 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1957).
"Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U.S. 183, 190 (1887).
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knowledge that some of the statements in an application are incorrect does
not of itself put the insurer on inquiry, and charge it with knowledge of
all the facts that an inquiry, would disclose."'4 2 Rather, it is the character
of the information possessed by the insurer which is determinative.4"
From the facts disclosed in the application, the insurer would have
no occasion to suspect that the physician's recent discovery of the appli-
cant's physical defects indicated an uninsurable condition. Instead, the
more reasonable inference was that the affirmative answers in question 11
pertained to the applicant's only previous illness disclosed in the application,
namely, the appendectomy in 1964. Such an inference is clearly supported
in light of Barden's assertion of good health at the time of the application.
These facts being insufficient to impose a duty of inquiry44 and an in-
vestigation being unlikely to yield the vital information, it is difficult to
justify the court's decision on the waiver issue. Waiver, being the volun-
tary relinquishment of a known right,45 necessarily requires knowledge of
the existence of that right and an intent to surrender it.40 Without the
requisite character of information (and no reason to obtain it), the in-
surer could hardly be held to have intentionally relinquished his equitable
right to rescind.
Such a result-oriented decision as Barden is particularly difficult to
reconcile with the basic notion of uberrima fides. Since the parties deal at
arms length, the insurer must of necessity rely upon the applicant's good
faith for its knowledge of the facts.47 Prior to Barden a prime deterrent
against a breach of this good faith was the knowledge on the part of the
insured that should his misrepresentations be discovered within the con-
testable period, his wager with the insurer would yield no more than
his total investment. The decision in Barden, however, effectively re-
duces the time allowed for the insurer's challenge and, in so doing, serves
notice upon the clever but uninsurable applicant that the odds in his favor
have been increased. By removing several questionable issues from the
" Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hawley, 123 F.2d 479, 482-83 (4th
Cir. 1941) (applying North Carolina law).
I8 d. at 483.
"In Hawley the insurer inquired and learned that the insured had been cured of
an affliction prior to the application but was not precluded from establishing a de-
fense of a related illness that was undisclosed by both the insured and the prior
investigation.
"16A J. APPLEmAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTicE § 9081 (1968).
Brady v. Funeral Benefit Ass'n, 205 N.C. 5, 7, 169 S.E. 823, 824 (1933).
'" Comment, Material Misrepresentation As a Requirement For Rescission of
Insurance Contracts, 73 DicK. L. REv. 250 (1969).
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consideration of the jury, the policy manifested by section 58-30 of the
North Carolina General Statutes has been stretched to an extreme.
WILLIAM W. MAYWHORT
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions and Housing
Code Enforcement
The low income tenant in North Carolina must rely primarily upon
municipal housing codes to ameliorate substandard housing conditions.'
Although enforcement of code regulations has to some extent elevated the
quality of existing urban housing, the process of repair under the codes,
particularly for the benefit of the low income tenant, is hampered by the
probability of considerable delay.
There may be delay between the first appearance of the defect and
tne inspector's knowledge of the defect. Since a limited number of in-
spectors must inspect not only those dwellings suspected of being sub-
standard but also all other housing in the city,2 a general program of area
inspections is tedious and time consuming. Therefore, inspectors are
forced to rely upon reports of code violations from interested parties as an
additional means of discovering violations. A tenant of adequate means,
having a bargaining power equal to that of the landlord, is likely to repair
himself or prompt his landlord to repair a serious defect rather than
reporting it and awaiting municipal action under the enforcement process.
But a low income tenant can seldom undertake repair; furthermore, a
paucity of decent housing3 may discourage him from antagonizing his
landlord by reporting code violations.
The landlord might also retard the process of repair after the defect
has been discovered by the inspector. A recalcitrant landlord of slum
property will hesitate to expend money for repair of premises of only
tenable value4 and may take advantage of methods available under the
Enabling legislation for municipal housing codes is found in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160-182 (Supp. 1969).
For example, there are six building inspectors to implement a program of city-
wide housing inspection for the city of Durham. When the program is completed,
it will have taken about ten years. Interview with Building Inspector for the City of
Durham, North Carolina, Dec. 10, 1970.
The North Carolina General Assembly has recognized that the state suffers
from a housing shortage and that a substantial number of existing dwellings are in
a substandard condition. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 (1966) (legislation enabling
the establishment of municipal housing authorities).
'See Symposhnz--Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAV. L. Rnv.
801 (1965).
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